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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW IN THE 1980's: THE




Pupil transportation remedies have increasingly become the end
of desegregation litigation rather than the means of eliminating
dual school systems that deprive black pupils of equal educational
opportunity. In so shifting the emphasis of desegregation law, the
courts have antagonized the other branches of government and the
American people.1 Although courts are bound by the Constitution,
* Attorney, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; BA., 1978, Georgetown University, J.D.,
1982, Vanderbilt University. This article was completed while Mr. Devins was a research
associate at the Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University. The views ex-
pressed in this article are those of the author. The author would like to thank James Blum-
stein, Bruce Dallas, Richard Pride, and Gus Winter for commenting on an earlier version of
this article.
1. Congress has considered enacting legislation which would severely limit the jurisdiction
of federal courts on issues such as school desegregation, abortion, and school prayer. Last
year, for example, Congress considered enacting legislation which
provides that no federal courts can order the transportation of a student to a
public school unless the student is attending a particular school voluntarily or
the requirement is 'reasonable.' The requirement would not be 'reasonable'
under specified circumstances, including if the time consumed in traveling to
and from school for a particular student exceeded thirty minutes a day or if
the distance traveled to and from school exceeded 10 miles a day.
J. Stedman, Busing for School Desegregation, CoNo. RESARCH SERVICE, July 1982, at 2. For
a general discussion of such proposed legislation as well as an analysis of Congress' ability to
limit federal court jurisdiction, see Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Author-
ity to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 IAv. L. REy. 17 (1981); see also
Abraham, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: A "Self-Inflicted Wound?", 65 JuticATUR
179 (1981); Kay, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The unforseen impact on courts and
Congress, 65 JuDicATuRE 185 (1981); Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The consti-
tutional basis for the proposals in Congress today, 65 JUDICATURE 190 (1981); Taylor, Lim-
iting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The unconstitutionality of current legislative proposals,
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they should not be bound by misconstrued principles of constitu-
tional law.
The recent Nashville, Tennessee desegregation lawsuit, Kelley v.
Metropolitan County Board of Education,2 represents one signifi-
65 JUDICATURE 199 (1981). Congress has also considered the enactment of appropriations
restrictions that would prohibit the Department of Justice from instituting lawsuits that
"require directly or indirectly the transportation of any student to a school other than the
school which is nearest the student's home (except in special circumstances)." Amendment
to H.R. 3462, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H2796 (1981). In 1974, Congress enacted
legislation which sought to restrict court-ordered busing. The enactment provided, in part,
that "[n]o [federal] court . . . shall . . . order the implementation of a plan that would
require the transportation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next
closest to his place of residence." 20 U.S.C. § 1714 (1976). The legislation had little effect,
however, because Congress also recognized that courts could order mandatory pupil reas-
signments if "such remedies. . . are essential to correct particular denials of equal educa-
tional opportunity or equal protection of the laws." 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (1976). As a matter of
course, federal courts rarely bother to determine whether busing is essential before ordering
it. In fact, no United States Supreme Court decision concerning busing has referred to the
statute. But see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), stay denied, 523
F.2d 917 (1st Cir.), afi'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), reh.
denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1977).
The Reagan Justice Department has rejected mandatory busing as an appropriate remedy
in desegregation lawsuits, claiming that busing "dilute[s] the essential [national] consensus
that racial discrimination is wrong and should not be tolerated in any form." Speech by
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, before the Dela-
ware Bar Association, Feb. 1982, at 9. See infra note 131. The Justice Department also
makes limited use of the presumption mandating busing in an entire school district when
intentional segregation exists in a significant portion of it. See Court-Ordered Busing: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981) (statement of William B. Reynolds). Finally, the Reagan
Justice Department has concluded that Congress could constitutionally prohibit federal
courts from ordering mandatory busing remedies, provided that such remedies involved
more than thirty minutes of travel time or more than ten miles of travel distance. See Let-
ter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to Peter W. Rodino, Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary (May 6, 1982). For a discussion of these Department of Justice
policies, see LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITHOUT JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN CrviL RIGHTS IN 1981-82 (1982); WASHINGTON
COUNCIL ON LAWYERS, REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS: THE FIRST TWENTY MONTHS (1982); DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, CORRECTING THE RECORD OF CwVm RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, JANUARY 20, 1981
TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1982; A RESPONSE To THE REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF LAW-
YH-S (1982); Smith, Yes We Do Enforce Civil Rights Laws, The Washington Post, July 10,
1983, at B1.
A February 1981 Gallup poll reflects the popular opposition to forced busing. This "sur-
vey shows opinion among whites 4-to-1 in opposition to busing. Blacks, however, are 2-to-1
in favor of this means of achieving better racial balance in the schools." Gallup, Whites,
Blacks in Sharp Disagreement on Busing, at 1 (Feb. 5, 1981).
2. 492 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), rev'd, 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
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cant strand in school desegregation cases.3 In May 1980, United
States District Judge Thomas Wiseman ruled that factors other
than racial composition could be considered in the modification of
the preexisting busing order for Nashville.4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, overturned the
Wiseman decision in July 1982.' The appellate court held that
modifications in desegregation remedies must reflect current black-
white student population ratios, even if such an approach cannot
effectively desegregate the schools and is educationally unsound.6
The United States Supreme Court declined to comment on the
Sixth Circuit's approach, refusing to review the case in January
1983.'
3. The Nashville case exemplifies the inability of federal courts to respond to the possible
failure of mandatory court-ordered desegregation techniques. Another significant strand of
school desegregation litigation concerns voluntary desegregation techniques that are usually
the byproduct of a consent decree. See, e.g., Lidell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. I11. 1983). For an extensive
analysis of the Chicago lawsuit, see Devins and Stedman, New Federalism in Education:
The Meaning of Chicago School Desegregation, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. - (1984).
4. 492 F. Supp. at 167.
5. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
6. The Sixth Circuit narrowly defined "effectiveness" as the attainment of unitary status
measured solely in terms of current' black-white student population ratios. The court
deemed irrelevant the impact of white flight on past desegregation orders and concerns over
educational achievement. See infra notes 120-26; see also Devins, New Dilemmas and Op-
portunities in Integrating Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1983, at 24; Devins, Did Cincinnati
Court Err on Busing?, The Nashville Banner, Sept. 30, 1982.
7. See 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). Commentators disagree on the significance that should be
accorded Supreme Court denials of certiorari. In Darr v. Burford, Justice Frankfurter re-
marked: "The denial means that this Court has refused to take the case. It means nothing
else." 339 U.S. 200, 226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Other Justices, however, have
recognized that certiorari denials may have some significance. For example, Justice Jackson
commented:
The Court is not quite of one mind on the subject. Some say denial means
nothing, others say it means nothing much. Realistically, the first position is
untenable and the second is unintelligible .... True, neither those outside of
the court, nor on many occasions those inside of it, know just what reasons led
six Justices to withhold consent to a certiorari.... Because no one knows all
that a denial means, does it mean that it means nothing?
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Reed went one
step further than Justice Jackson:
[We think] that where a record distinctly presenting a substantial federal con-
stitutional question disentangled from problems of procedure is brought here
by certiorari and denied, courts dealing with ... the same issues presented in
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The Nashville school board began implementing the Sixth Cir-
cuit's busing order in the fall of 1983.1 The effects of the appellate
earlier applications for writs of certiorari to this court, should have the power
to take the denial into consideration in determining their actions.
Id. at 456. Although Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion in Brown v. Allen, Justice
Frankfurter's view prevailed on the certiorari issue.
Social science evidence supports the conclusion that certiorari denials indicate the Jus-
tices' views on the merits of a case. S. Sidney Ulmer prepared a study in 1972 which indi-
cated that between 1947 and 1956 eight of the eleven Justices surveyed voted against peti-
tioners on the merits in cases in which they had voted to deny certiorari. Ulmer, The
Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to Decison 'On the Merits', 4 POLICY 429
(1972); see also Ulmer, Voting Blocs and 'Access' to the Supreme Court: 1947-56 Terms, 16
JuRmERrmcs J. 6 (1975). Another authority offers additional information:
Even more striking are the figures for the post-Douglas October 1978 Term. In
that Term, the Court denied 3406 petitions for certiorari. During the 1978
term a total of 405 notations of dissent to the denial were made by eight of the
nine Justices, and six of the Justices dissented between 23 and 131 times.
Equally striking, eight of the Justices indicated on some occasions their posi-
tion on the merits of the case.
Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1258 (1979).
In his comprehensive article on certiorari denials, Peter Linzer offers some additional
insights:
That dissatisfaction with the decision below plays a part when certiorari is
granted can hardly be doubted from the high percentage of reversals on the
merits and from the findings of ... Ulmer .... [W]hen two-thirds or more of
the Justices agree to deny certiorari and another Justice dissents on the merits
we can hardly believe that those in the majority-who are willing to consider
the merits when they dissent-have suddenly shut their minds to all but neu-
tral reasons. More likely, they have considered the arguments on the merits
and found themselves not greatly dissatisfied .... Absence of dissatisfaction
with the decision below may not be the same thing as agreement with it, and
definitely is not agreement with its reasoning, but it surely shows a lack of
strong belief that the decision below was wrong and that it was important
enough to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 1302-03 (emphasis in original).
Estimating the significance that should be given to the Court's refusal to review Kelley is
especially difficult. Certainly, the case raised a significant legal issue. See infra notes 133-47.
A strong argument can be made that Justices either voted against granting certiorari be-
cause they agreed with the holding or were waiting for a clearer case to overturn. That none
of the Justices dissented to the denial in Kelley while Justice Powell (joined by Justices
Rehnquist and Stewart) filed a vigorous dissent to the Court's certiorari denial in a similar
but weaker case, Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980),
supports this interpretation. Yet, as demonstrated by Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the
issues, these considerations are not legally significant. Instead, they merely place the Kelley
case in a broader social context. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
8. On April 14, 1983, Judge Wiseman held a hearing on the Metropolitan County Board
of Education's "Plan Submitted in Response to Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit." NAACP plaintiffs made no objection to this plan. On June 1, 1983, Judge
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court's expansive holding and shortsighted reasoning, however, are
not limited to Nashville. The Sixth Circuit's insistence on a contin-
uing school board obligation to adjust the school system to reflect
black-white student population ratios sounds a clear warning to
school districts nationwide that they may expect judicial oversight.
Worse than this continued judicial surveillance, Kelley suggests
that school districts may have to abide by a failing desegregation
agenda, which makes not only for bad education policy but also for
bad constitutional law.
The late Alexander Bickel noted in his book, The Supreme
Court and The Idea of Progress, that "no policy that a court can
order, and a school board, a city or even the state has the capacity
to put into effect, will in fact result in the foreseeable future in
racially balanced public schools. Only a reordering of the environ-
ment... might have an appreciable impact."9 In the implementa-
tion of a general policy by current desegregation decisions, Profes-
sor Bickel thus would recognize a dangerous centralization of
government in which court decisions-and hence the Court as an
institution-could become irrelevant. This centralization is danger-
ous because the Court traditionally has been a dispute resolver
that relies on others to successfully implement its decisions. Con-
sidering executive, legislative, and popular opposition to forced
busing, the Court may find itself faced only with those who would
inhibit, rather than implement, its decisions.10
Wiseman approved the board's plan in the form of a consent decree. Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 2904 mem. op. (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1983). Judge Wiseman
found that, under this plan, "bvery effort has been made to draw zones for schools which
will approximate the 33% black student population presently existing in the school system,
with a deviation of 15% on either side of this percentage." Id. at 2. Simultaneously, "the
Board of Education retains the flexibility to make refinements where necessary in the plan
to improve the integrity of zone lines, to improve feeder patterns, so long as these improve-
ments do not adversely impact the pupil assignment plan." Id. at 3. To ensure good faith
compliance with this plan, the district court required the School Board annually to report
on the following- (1) the use of portable classrooms; (2) proposed construction; and (3) pro-
posed zone changes. Id.
9. A. BicKEL, THE SUPRME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 132 (1970). See infra note
10.
10. This opposition has many implications. First, congressional opposition to judicially
created desegregation policies might result in a "constitutional crisis" if Congress enacts
legislation which seeks to restrict the remedial authority of federal courts. Second, if Con-
gress does so limit court jurisdiction, there would be inadequate redress for acts of inten-
tional segregation. Third, Congress might seek to enact further legislation restricting courts'
19841
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This Article maintains that federal district court judges have the
power to modify desegregation orders in light of a school system's
experience in implementing a mandatory pupil transportation rem-
edy. Racial discrimination is an egregious offense. Desegregation
remedies, however, can do no more than correct substantive viola-
tions of the Constitution. These remedies cannot provide greater
relief to a prevailing party than a restoration to the condition that
would exist, absent an unconstitutional act.1 Judges should begin
with the presumption that a school district would naturally be in-
tegrated absent illegal governmentally fostered segregation. Conse-
quently, the first remedy in a desegregation lawsuit should involve
measures designed to achieve racial balance in the school system,
such as mandatory pupil transportation and the restructuring of
attendance zones.12 Yet, if a school board has been unable to de-
segregate its system through the good faith implementation of a
mandatory desegregation plan over an extended period of time, the
judiciary should permit that school system to modify its remedial
obligations to accord with its experience in implementing that re-
medial plan.
Two considerations support such a conclusion. First, the failure
of a school district's protracted good faith efforts to implement a
mandatory pupil reassignment plan rebuts the presumption of a
naturally integrated world. Additional mandatory remedies requir-
ing black-white student population ratios would be overbroad be-
cause racial balance might not represent conditions that would
have existed in the absence of unconstitutional segregation. Sec-
ond, plaintiffs no longer have an interest in population-ratio reme-
dies once the presumption of a naturally integrated world has been
power on social issues such as abortion and school prayer. Fourth, the executive branch
might restrict its role as enforcer of desegregation law. In fact, some argue this has already
occurred with the Reagan administration's refusal to pursue mandatory busing remedies.
See supra note 1. Fifth, public dissatisfaction with current desegregation remedies might
lead to disobeying court orders. Subsequent white, and black, flight and loss of community
support would further deteriorate the public schools. For a more complete discussion of this
issue, see supra note 1.
11. See Blumstein, Legal Issues in the Desegregation of Postsecondary Education 9
(June i981) (working paper available in Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies
Library).
12. Under certain circumstances, voluntary desegregation techniques can satisfy these cri-
teria. See infra notes 19, 162.
[Vol. 26:7
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rebutted. Initially, plaintiffs can adduce social science evidence
suggesting that forced busing remedies are the best solution to ra-
cial segregation in the public schools. Once mandatory reassign-
ments have proved ineffective in addressing the problem of racial
segregation, however, plaintiffs lose the empirical (or even norma-
tive) basis to justify a claim for population-ratio relief.
This Article consists of four sections. The first section provides
an overview of Supreme Court decisions touching on the question
of desegregation remedies. This section suggests that the Court's
conclusions on the scope of desegregation remedies necessarily
comport with the Court's belief in a naturally integrated or a natu-
rally segregated world. The second section presents a case history
of the Nashville desegregation lawsuit. This section particularly
emphasizes the treatment given Supreme Court precedents by the
district court and court of appeals in addressing the novel issue of
whether and when a school district's attempt to implement a
school desegregation plan becomes legally significant. Further ex-
ploring this novel issue, the third section of this Article suggests
that the implementation of a school desegregation plan satisfies
the requirement of legal significance. Therefore, this section con-
cludes that the Sixth Circuit wrongly applied Supreme Court
precepts in its review of the district court opinion. The final sec-
tion of this Article recommends the adoption of a standard of re-
view in desegregation lawsuits which recognizes busing as a pre-
ferred initial remedy in desegregation lawsuits, but permits school
boards to rebut the busing presumption by demonstrating that
busing ineffectively addresses the problem of past racial discrimi-
nation in their school system. School boards can make this demon-
stration by showing that the mandatory transportation remedy was
ineffective despite good faith efforts to implement the plan over an
extended period of time.
II. Brown IN PERSPECTIVE
In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka I (Brown 1)13 the
Supreme Court struck down governmentally imposed segregation
in public schools. In doing so, the Court affirmed plaintiff
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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NAACP's contention "that segregated public schools [were] not
'equal' and [could not] be made 'equal,' and that hence [plaintiffs
were] deprived of the equal protection of the laws. ' 14 Brown I thus
established the basic substantive principle that intentional segre-
gative acts are unconstitutional.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka II (Brown I) 15 estab-
lished the remedial structure to enforce the holding of Brown L
The remedial structure rested on two mandates. First, after recog-
nizing that regional differences would make the district courts the
appropriate forum to oversee desegregation lawsuits, the Court im-
posed a duty on local school boards to disestablish the governmen-
tally created dual school system to the district court's satisfac-
tion. 6 Second, the Court required that school boards implement
desegregation orders with "all deliberate speed."1
A. Integration versus Desegregation: The Extent of The Affirma-
tive Duty
Brown I and Brown 11 served as broad pronouncements on the
evil of racial discrimination and the need for the swift disestablish-
ment of dual school systems. The decisions provided little guid-
ance, however, regarding the structure of desegregation remedies.
Aside from suggesting that Brown 11 remedies address "varied lo-
cal school problems," 18 the Court remained silent on the nature
and scope of the remedies. The Court thus left unresolved the cen-
tral issue whether a school board could satisfy the Brown man-
dates merely by permitting black and white students to attend
previously one-race schools or whether school districts must act af-
firmatively to bring together black and white schoolchildren. The
Court's use of sociological evidence in Brown I, suggesting that
black students would psychologically and educationally benefit
from attending racially mixed schools, encouraged black plaintiffs
to seek affirmative desegregtion remedies.19 The Brown decisions
14. Id. at 488.
15. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
16. See id. at 299.
17. See id. at 301.
18. Id. at 299.
19. The social science evidence introduced in Brown I suggested "that Negro children,
from a very young age, are sensitive to and strongly affected by prejudice and discrimination
[Vol. 26:7
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failed to discuss whether courts had authority to issue such affirm-
ative relief. In other words, the Court left unanswered the question
whether affirmative, effect-oriented remedies would restore a plain-
tiff class to the position that would exist absent unconstitutional
segregation or whether such affirmative relief would go too far by
restructuring a possibly segregated world.20
Courts initially interpreted the "all deliberate speed" language
of Brown II as requiring a policy of nondiscriminatory admis-
sions.21 This interpretation permitted recalcitrant school districts
to frustrate the spirit of the Brown decisions through the use of
remedial devices, such as open admissions policies, which placed
generally." Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Anal-
ysis, 60 CALi. L. REv. 275, 279 (1972); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.
11 (1954). Consequently, black children had an interest in becoming part of a racially mixed
school system.
This sociological evidence, however, does not support the contention that desegregation
obligations can be satisfied solely by providing educational offerings, unless those educa-
tional offerings enhance the likelihood of increased racial mixing in the schools. Racial isola-
tion, not educational achievement, is the wrong to be addressed in desegregation lawsuits.
But see Milliken v. Bradley H1, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (educational remedies, designed to im-
prove achievement levels of students attending previously segregated schools, are a proper
component of a school desegregation plan). See infra note 120.
Voluntary remedies, relying on magnet schools and enhanced educational offerings, must
therefore promise to effectively desegregate area schools to pass constitutional muster. To
accomplish these ends, educational offerings must be sufficiently attractive to entice stu-
dents to voluntarily transfer to a school outside their neighborhood. The costs of such effec-
tive voluntary techniques are substantial and may surpass the costs of mandatory devices.
See R. Blank, R. Denther, D. Baltzell, and D. Chapster, Survey of Magnet Schools: Analyz-
ing a Model for Quality Integrated Education 4-5 (Executive Summary. September 1983).
These staggering costs are exemplified in two ongoing segregation lawsuits. In Liddell v.
Missouri, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that St. Louis'
voluntary desegregation plan would cost the state and the city approximately $500,000,000.
See 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984). Similiarly, a federal district court in Chicago ruled that
the city's desegregation plan would cost approximately $170,000,000 to implement for the
1984-85 school year. United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. I. June 8, 1984).
20. The Court's refusal to pass judgment on this issue can, in part, be explained because
"In]one of the empirical studies brought to the Court's attention... even purported to
isolate the effects of public school segregation per se ...... Goodman, supra note 19, at 279.
Such evidence finally came to the Court's attention in the form of the 1966 Coleman Re-
port. See infra note 25. The combined effect of this evidence and the disappointing efforts
of southern school systems to desegregate their schools ultimately led the Court to require
school boards to take affirmative steps to eradicate past racial discrimination. See infra text
accompanying notes 25-30.
21. See J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAAKE: THE SUPREmE COURT AND SCHOOL INTE-
GRATION (1979).
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the burden on students to elect to go to a previously one race
school.22 Congress' passage of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,2 3 which allowed a willing executive branch to prohibit federal
funds to recalcitrant school districts, increased the pressure on
school boards to comply with Brown II.
24
The 1966 Coleman Report exposed freedom-of-choice as "deseg-
regation in name only, '2 5 which led to increasing dissatisfaction
with these plans. The Coleman Report, according to Vanderbilt
Law Professor James Blumstein, "developed a pervasive view that
integration in the classroom, per se, had a beneficial effect on black
children, was not harmful educationally or socially for white chil-
dren, and would help offset years of officially fostered racial isola-
tion and stereotyping."26 The report helped provide an impetus for
an effect-oriented approach to determining the legitimacy of school
boards' efforts to abate desegregation.
The first major Supreme Court decision after the Coleman study
was the 1968 case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County.27 Green established the principle that school boards gov-
erning previously segregated school systems had an "affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch."2 8 Specifically, Green concerned a freedom-of-
choice plan in a rural southern school district. This plan gave black
and white students the choice of attending the previously all-black
high school or the previously all-white high school. The plan pre-
dictably led to a low, fifteen percent, crossover rate of blacks to
previously state mandated white schools. The Court invalidated
the plan, holding that an acceptable plan not only must be made in
good faith, but also must disestablish the dual school system at the
22. See Devins and Stedman, supra note 3; see Kirp, School Desegregation and the Lim-
its of Legislation, 47 PUB. INTEREST 101 (1977).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
24. See Kirp, supra note 22; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School
Desegregtion, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485, 531-37 (1978).
25. J. COLEMAN, E. CAMBELL, L. HOBSON, J. MCPARTAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFELD, AND R.
YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
26. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 3.
27. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
28. Id. at 437-38.
[Vol. 26:7
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earliest practicable date. 9 The Court demanded that school boards
come forward with a plan "that promises realistically to work
now."30 Although Green specified no precise standard for deter-
mining effectiveness, it appeared to suggest that the Court would
examine black-white ratios as an indication of a plan's success.31
In 1971, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Ed-
ucation2 settled the principle that courts would look at the actual
effects of a desegregation plan in judging its adequacy, although
not every school in a system necessarily had to be desegregated for
a plan to work satisfactorily. Swann recognized the use of black-
white pupil ratios and mandatory student reassignments as "start-
ing point[s] in the process of shaping a remedy. 3 3 The Court rec-
ognized that, to eliminate all vestiges of an unconstitutional dual
school system, desegregation remedies might have to be "adminis-
tratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre.
'34
Swann extended the reasoning of Green to an urban context.
Unlike rural New Kent County, Charlotte-Mecklenburg was the
nation's forty-third largest metropolitan area. 5 As in New Kent
County, however, most black students attended all-black schools."
The school board maintained its system of segregated education
"by locating schools in Negro residential areas and fixing the size
of the schools to accommodate the needs of immediate neighbor-
hoods."37 Faced with pervasive school segregation and a school sys-
tem that "served more than 84,000 pupils in 107 schools,"38 the
district court felt compelled to rearrange attendance zones and to
order transportation to eradicate past discrimination. The Su-
preme Court upheld the bold plan in its entirety.
39
Swann, however, did acknowledge that desegregation remedies
29. See id. at 442.
30. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
31. See Blumstein, supra note 11, at 4.
32. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
33. Id. at 25.
34. Id. at 28.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Two-thirds of the black students who attended schools within the city of Charlotte
"attended 21 schools which were either totally Negro or more than 99 percent Negro." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 32.
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may be limited if they endanger "the health of the children or sig-
nificantly impinge on the educational process. '40 More impor-
tantly, the Court held that once school officials made an affirma-
tive good faith effort to desegregate their schools, they need not
make "year-to-year adjustments of the racial composition of stu-
dent bodies. 41 In other words, school districts were not required to
maintain a certain level of racial balance among schools. Instead,
they were required only to eliminate all vestiges of past discrimina-
tion. Consequently, there could be substantial racial imbalance
within a school system if governmentally fostered segregation had
not contributed to that imbalance.
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler4' reaffirmed the
Court's ruling in Swann that a school district subject to Brown II
liability had an affirmative duty to desegregate rather than to inte-
grate. Spangler concerned a 1974 district court order that required
the Pasadena Unified School District annually to readjust its at-
tendance zones in order to conform with a 1970 court order which
had mandated that no district school have "a majority of any mi-
nority students."'43 The district court had held that, in the event of
widespread racial imbalance or segregation, the "use of a strict
neighborhood school policy and a policy against cross-town busing
take[s] on constitutional significance as a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. ' 44 Four years later, the district court found
the school board still subject to Brown H duties despite its literal
compliance with the 1970 order.45 Thus, the district court prohib-
ited implementation of a freedom-of-choice plan.40 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a divided
4741opinion. The Supreme Court reversed.48 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for a majority of the Court, concluded that "[t]he District
Court's interpretation of the order appears to contemplate the
40. Id. at 30-31.
41. Id. at 32.
42. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
43. Id. at 428 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 505
(D.C. Cal. 1970)).
44. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 520 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
45. Spangler v. Pasadena City, 375 F. Supp. 1304, 1308-09 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
46. See id. at 1309.
47. See 519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. See 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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'substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial
balance or mixing' which the Court in Swann expressly disap-
proved.'49 The Court stated, as central to the holding, that "subse-
quent changes in the racial mix in the Pasadena schools might be
caused by factors for which the defendants [school board] could
not be considered responsible." 50 Spangler, however, did not indi-
cate the remedy that was needed to eliminate vestiges of previ-
ously imposed government segregation.
B. The Scope of Desegregation Remedies: The Nature of the
World Absent Intentional Desegregation
Brown 11 remedial orders should rectify the racial imbalance
among district schools that arose from prior intentional segrega-
tion. Therefore, an affirmative pro-integration remedy suggests
that the world absent intentional segregation would be integrated.
Alternatively, a remedy designed merely to rectify specific acts of
intentional segregation suggests that the world could be naturally
segregated.5 1
Social scientists pursue an academic, and sometimes fiercely
emotional, debate concerning the natural integration or segregation
of the world.5 2 Ambiguous court standards reflect a similar disa-
greement among judges. School systems may remain racially im-
balanced so long as they have not practiced intentional segrega-
tion. 3 If the school system has practiced some intentional
segregation, however, it often must rectify its actions through sys-
tem-wide mandatory pupil transportaton.
54
Keyes v. (Denver) School District No. 155 held that purposeful
segregation in a significant portion of a school district justified a
system-wide remedy. The Court reasoned that intentional segre-
49. Id. at 434 (quoting Swanm v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971)).
50. 427 U.S. at 434.
51. See Blumstein, supra note 11, at 9-13; Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and
the Courts, 51 TEx. L. REv. 411, 456-64 (1973).
52. See infra note 150.
53. See Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); see infra text
accompanying notes 61-69.
54. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman II, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 76-90.
55. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
56. See id. at 208.
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gation in a limited area suggested a reciprocal impact district
wide.57 The positive correlation between the purposeful (de jure)
segregation in the Park Hill section of Denver and the observed
(de facto) segregation elsewhere justified the system-wide remedy
at issue in Keyes.58 The school system could rebut this presump-
tion by showing that there were "separated, identifiable, and unre-
lated" areas of the district that were not affected by the impermis-
sible conduct.59 Put differently, a school district subject to the
Keyes presumption "must either desegregate its schools or satisfy
the almost impossible burden of demonstrating that the system
would have been segregated regardless of its conduct. '60 So far, no
school district has rebutted the Keyes presumption.
Two 1977 Supreme Court decisions defined the breadth of the
Keyes presumption. In Austin Independent School District v.
United States,61 the Court reaffirmed the Keyes requirement that
a court find at least some intentional segregative conduct before
requiring desegregation. The Court remanded a ruling by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that de facto
segregation alone did justify remedial action.6" The Fifth Circuit
had held that
[s]chool authorities may not constitutionally use a neighborhood
assignment policy that creates segregated schools in a district
with ethnically segregated residential patterns. A segregated sys-
tem is the foreseeable and inevitable result of such an assign-
ment policy. When this policy is used, we may infer that the
school authorities have acted with segregative intent.6 3
The Fifth Circuit based its conclusion on demographics establish-
ing that half of minority preschool students attended schools with
populations composed of more than three-fifths minority groups,
57. See id.
58. See id. at 204. Park Hill contained approximately forty percent of Denver's total
black school population. Id. at 199.
59. Id. at 203.
60. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 10.
61. 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.).
62. See id., remanding, United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1976).
63. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 392 (5th Cir. 1976).
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even though the school district was sixty percent white.6 More sig-
nificantly, seventeen percent of black high school students and
thirty percent of Mexican-American high school students attended
an all minority high school while sixty percent of white high school
students attended schools with populations composed of more than
four-fifths whites.6 5 The Supreme Court based the remand on its
1976 decision in Washington v. Davis, 6 which had upheld the use
of a screening test for police officer candidates. Despite the test's
disproportionate impact on minority applicants, the test was al-
lowed because no intentional desegregation had been shown.6
No majority opinion was filed in Austin. Justice Powell, how-
ever, filed a concurring opinion expressing his opposition to the ap-
pellate order: "[T]he [Fifth Circuit] plan is designed to achieve
some predetermined racial and ethnic balance in the schools rather
than to remedy the constitutional violations commited by the
school authorities."68 In short, Justice Powell argued that de facto
segregation would exist in the Austin school system regardless of
the school's de jure segregation. He concluded that "racial and eth-
nic imbalance in urban public schools across the country . . . is
[caused by] the imbalance in residential patterns . . . patterns
[which] are typically beyond the control of school authorities."6 9
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman I (Dayton 1)70 ad-
dressed the issue of how a school district could rebut the Keyes
presumption. Dayton I held that the district-wide presumption of
Keyes did not apply to a school district that had committed three
relatively isolated discriminatory acts, despite substantial racial
imbalance in student enrollment throughout the school system. 1
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court, asserted:
[A court] must determine how much incremental segregative ef-
fect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton
School population as presently constituted, when that distribu-
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id.
66. Austin, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
67. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232-52 (1976).
68. Austin, 429 U.S. 990, 993 n.3 (1976) (mer.) (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 994.
70. 443 U.S. 406 (1977).
71. See id. at 419-20.
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tion is compared to what it would have been in the absence of
such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to
redress that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide
impact may there be a systemwide remedy. 2
In requiring a district court to determine the incremental effect of
segregative conduct, the Dayton I decision implies that racial im-
balance may exist absent intentional government segregation. Ac-
cording to James Blumstein, "Dayton I appears to respond to a
growing skepticism among some justices as to the validity of the
pro-desegregation [naturally integrated world] assumptions of
Green and Swann.
' '7 3
The Supreme Court's shift from a naturally integrated model in
cases decided between 1968 and 197374 to a possibly segregated
model in cases decided between 1974 and 1977 7 abruptly ended in
1979 with two decisions, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
I 6 and Columbus Board of Education v. Penick. Dayton H and
Columbus extended the Keyes presumption from focusing solely
on the location of segregation (segregation in one part of a system
implying segregation in other parts of the system) to inquiring
about the time of segregation (segregation at one time implying
segregation at other times).
Dayton H represents the culmination of litigation resulting from
the Supreme Court's remand in Dayton L On remand, plaintiffs
had challenged practices and policies of the school board such as
faculty hiring and assignments, the use of optional attendance
zones and transfer policies, the location and construction of new
and expanded school facilities, and the rescission of prior resolu-
tions recognizing the board's responsibility to eradicate racial sepa-
ration in the public schools.7 8 The district court observed, however,
that despite "an inexcusable history of mistreatment of black stu-
72. Id. at 420.
73. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 14.
74. The Green (1968), Swann (1971), and Keyes (1973) decisions suggest a naturally inte-
grated model. See supra text accompanying notes 27-41, 55-60.
75. The Pasadena (1976), Austin (1977), and Dayton I (1977) decisions suggest a possibly
segregated model. See supra text accompanying notes 42-50, 61-73.
76. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
77. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
78. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 532-33.
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dents," plaintiffs had failed to prove any current incremental seg-
regative effects from acts of segregation that occurred over twenty
years previously.7 9 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the
school board had a continuing obligation to eliminate past discrim-
ination.80 The Supreme Court affirmed.81
Columbus involved facts similar to Dayton I. The Columbus
school system was highly segregated, with half of the schools being
ninety percent one race and an additional one-fifth of the schools
being eighty percent one race.2 As in Dayton II, the school board
had engaged in segregative conduct about the time of the Brown
decisions. 3 Unlike Dayton, the district court imposed a system-
wide remedy under the continuing obligation theory."M The Sixth
Circuit85 and the Supreme Court86 both affirmed the district court
decision.
The Court based its Dayton II and Columbus decisions on the
line of reasoning developed by the district court in Columbus:
[T]hat at the time of Brown I, the [school b]oard was operating
a dual school system, that it was constitutionally required to dis-
establish that system and its effects, that it had failed to dis-
charge this duty, and that the consequences of the dual system,
together with the intentionally segregative impact of various
practices since 1954, were of systemwide import and an appro-
priate basis for a systemwide remedy.87
The Court rejected the Dayton I provisions for distinguishing the
effects of segregation, holding that a plaintiff need not "prove with
respect to each individual act of discrimination precisely what ef-
fect it has had on current patterns of segregation."88 After Dayton
79. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
80. 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978).
81. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 526.
82. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 452.
83. See id. (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio
1977)).
84. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 453.
85. See 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978).
86. See 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
87. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534; see Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229,
260-61, 264-67 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (applying the analysis borrowed by the Court in Dayton H
and Columbus).
88. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 540.
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H and Columbus, past constitutional violations could serve as a
basis for relief, even though a plaintiff failed to show any current
impact from that past discrimination. James Blumstein summa-
rized the Dayton H and Columbus cases as follows:
[These cases represent] a return to the expansive causality no-
tions of Keyes, Swann and Green. The Court assumed that a
pre-1954 substantive violation, unremedied by affirmative action
of the Green/Swann standard, is the cause of current observed
segregation .... [T]he assumption is consistent with Green,
Swann, and Keyes and reinforces a (naturally integrated) theory
that private choice, unfettered by governmental inteference, will
generate a racially desegregated school system .... [T]he Su-
preme Court appears to have adopted an assumption that a ra-
cially desegregated society exists absent discriminatory govern-
mental action. 9
University of Chicago law professor Edmund W. Kitch criticized
these cases more severely:
The Court endorses an approach to the 'factual' question that
makes proof of a neighborhood social policy into proof of racial
discrimination. It then approves a remedy which, by implication,
assumes that a neighborhood social policy, when combined with
any significant residential segregation, is unconstitutional.
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of NAACP"' again reflected the
Court's pro-integration spirit. In Estes, the Courtrefused to review
the Fifth Circuit's overturning of a district court order that had
substituted educational remedies and neighborhood schools for
systemwide busing predicated on black-white student population
ratios.2 The district court had crafted its remedy in light of the
political dynamics of Dallas and emphasized educational quality
over racial balance.9 3 The appellate court required mandatory pu-
pil reassignments unless "the natural boundaries and traffic con-
89. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 16-17.
90. Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton and
Columbus, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 6 (1980).
91. 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (per curiam).
92. See id., dismissing cert. from Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), reversing
and remanding, 412 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
93. See Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
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siderations preclude either the pairing and clustering of schools or
the use of transportation to eliminate the large number of one-race
schools still existing. 894 Justice Powell, writing for three members
of the Court, felt that the Supreme Court should have reviewed
the case:
Unless courts carefully consider those issues [remedy related to
identifiable acts of segregation and effectiveness of a desegrega-
tion plan measured in social and educational costs], judicial
school desegregation will continue to be a haphazard exercise of
equitable power that can, 'like a loose cannon ... inflict indis-
criminate damage' on our schools and communities.9 5
The Supreme Court's refusal to review Estes demonstrated a natu-
rally integrated view because it thereby left standing a court order
requiring that the initial remedy resemble that in Swann." Estes,
therefore, assumed that the perceived outcome of mandatory bus-
ing best reflected the nature of the world without intentional gov-
ernment segregation.
Estes, Dayton II, and Columbus did not address the question
whether a school district's experience in implementing a Swann
remedy could rebut this presumption of a naturally integrated
world. That question was answered in Kelley.
94. Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1978).
95. Estes v. Metropolitan Branch of NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 445 (1980) (per curiam) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 367 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
96. Because literal compliance with only an approved desegregation plan obviates future
desegregation obligations, see supra text accompanying notes 42-50, current black-white
student population ratios will be the point of departure in crafting a desegregation plan
until a comprehensive desegregation plan has been approved.
Kelley conflicts with the interpretation of Swann and Pasadena given in Estes. The point
of departure for the district court's analysis was a post-Swann desegregation plan approved
by the Supreme Court, not post-plan black-white student population ratios. See infra notes
102-116 and accompanying text. When Estes was decided, no court had ever approved any
of the district court's desegregation plans. For that reason, the legal issue raised in Kelley
was of greater merit than that raised in Estes. See infra notes 102-106. Yet, in Estes, Jus-
tices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist filed a vigorous fifteen-page dissent to the Court's de-
nial of certiorari. This suggests that the Court's unanimous denial of certiorari in Kelley was
a political decision, possibly speaking to the merits of the case. See supra note 7. Both
Linzer, supra note 7, and the lengthy dissent filed in Estes, see supra note 7, suggest that
the denial of certiorari in Estes reflected the Court's view of the substantive issues or
merits.
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III. KELLEY V. METROPOLITAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
A. The Early Rounds (1955-1980)
The Nashville-Davidson County desegregation lawsuit began in
1955 when black school children filed suit to enjoin state imposed
racial segregation in the public schools of Nashville, Tennessee.97
In November 1969, plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate relief
following the Supreme Court's decision in Green v. County School
Board of Kent County. At that time, eighty-one percent of white
pupils attended schools with populations that were more than
ninety percent white, while sixty-two percent of black pupils at-
tended schools with populations that were more than ninety per-
cent black.98 Plaintiffs succeeded in their motion.99 While the court
devised a remedy, the Supreme Court decided Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education. The district court subsequently
approved a Swann plan which had been filed with the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 100
The 1971 district court order mandated the redrawing of zone
lines to achieve racial balance in individual schools.10 1 However, in
implementing the HEW plan the court found that requiring exten-
sive transportation was not feasible in outlying areas of five-hun-
dred square mile Davidson County; costs, distance, and common
sense dictated their exclusion.102 The court left unchanged the all-
white composition of twenty-two elementary schools and ten junior
and senior high schools lying on the county's perimeters. 03 The
court order, therefore, required desegregation only in an area
carved from the densely populated heart of the county, leaving the
97. See Kelley v. Board of Educ., Civ. No. 2904, mem. op. (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1983). The
history of the litigation and its relationship to developing school desegregation law through
1971 is explained in Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732, 735-42 (6th
Cir. 1972).
98. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 980, 987 n.4 (M.D.
Tenn. 1970).
99. See id. at 983-93.
100. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., No. 2094, mem. op. (M.D. Tenn.
June 28, 1971).
101. See id.
102. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 1, Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of
Educ., 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972).
103. See id. at 1-2.
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remainder untouched.10 4 The Sixth Circuit approved the district
court's order in 1972.105 The Supreme Court refused to review the
case.
06
In August 1972, the district court determined that the school
board's inadequate provision of transportation facilities indicated
that the school board had failed to implement the desegregation
plan in good faith. Following the 1972 court order, however, "[the
school board] acted in good faith in its efforts to comply with [the
1971] order while going about the task of operating a school sys-
tem.'10 7 During this period, however, the school board filed several
motions to modify the 1971 plan and plaintiffs filed several peti-
tions for contempt.' The district court did not respond to any of
these motions. In June 1979, newly appointed United States Dis-
trict Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., began hearings on all pending
matters.
B. The Wiseman Decision
Judge Wiseman found the 1971 court plan itself resegregative
because it excluded the predominately white suburbs on the out-
skirts of Davidson County and placed a disproportionate burden of
busing on black children. 09 Ironically, therefore, the "good faith
efforts of the school board in the implementation of the Court's
order" 1 0 amounted to unconstitutional segregation. After finding
104. See id.
105. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972).
106. See 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
107. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., No. 2956, mem. op. (M.D. Tenn. Feb.
23, 1983).
108. See Brief, supra note 102 at 3-6; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13-18, Kelley v.
Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972).
109. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 479 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (M.D. Tenn.
1979).
110. Id. at 123. NAACP plaintiffs objected to Judge Wiseman's determination that the
school board had acted in "good faith." First, the district court in 1972 determined that the
school board had failed to meet its affirmative obligation to provide a sufficient number of
buses to implement the 1971 plan. Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
7, Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Kelley, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). Second, Judge Wise-
man had found that the school board engaged in resegregative conduct by allowing students
assigned to a predominantly black school to transfer. The transfer option was "utilized ex-
tensively by white students assigned to (that black school) to escape such assignments." Id.
at 10 (quoting Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 479 F. Supp. at 124) (M.D.
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segregation, however, Judge Wiseman rejected the school board's
proposed busing plan, which focused on the problem of racial im-
balance among Davidson County schools.111 Judge Wiseman con-
sidered the plan impracticable because of (1) its failure to offer
realistic promise of a unitary system; (2) its disparate burden on
black school children; (3) its social cost in diminishing public sup-
port for education; (4) its educational cost and (5) its economic
cost.112 Judge Wiseman claimed (and this is crucial) that the court
was able to undertake such an analysis because it could review
Nashville's experience in "nine years of zoning and busing to
achieve a desegregated system and the changes that [had] taken
place in the community and in the attitude manifested by the
School Board."' 113
Tenn. 1979). The transfer option, however, was mandated by a Tennessee statute requiring
that students in a school without vocational education be permitted to transfer to a school
with vocational education. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-11-104 (Michie 1983) (discussed in
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 176 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)).
Third, from 1973 to 1978 the school board sought permission from the district court to
expand its facilities, to construct portable classrooms, and to use annexes and attendance
zones. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 110 at 8. Plaintiffs opposed all of these actions as
segregative and violative of the 1971 order. Id. Despite the district court's failure to grant
any of these motions, the school board implemented all of its proposals. In February 1983,
however, Judge Wiseman held that these acts were good faith efforts to comply with the
1971 order "while going about the task of operating a school system." Kelley v. Metropoli-
tan County Bd. of Educ., No. 2956, mem. op. (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 1983). The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals did not review Judge Wiseman's determination that the school board had
in good faith attempted to implement the 1971 plan.
Judge Wiseman's determination of this issue would have been of great significance if the
Supreme Court had decided to review the case. In Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler, the Supreme Court held that literal compliance with a desegregation order re-
lieved a school district of additional affirmative obligations, even though the order failed to
integrate the school system. See supra text accompanying notes 42-50. The issue whether
Pasadena extends to good faith compliance has not been addressed by the Supreme Court.
111. For a discussion of the components of the school board's plan, see Kelley v. Metro-
politan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 178-83 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). Interestingly, the
disproportionate burden that black students bore under the 1971 order initially concerned
the NAACP plaintiffs. Id. at 183-85. In fact, plaintiffs' educational expert testified that
black majority neighborhood schools might benefit black students educationally. See Brief,
supra note 102, at 8. As noted in Judge Wiseman's opinion, "the black plaintiffs urge upon
the court less busing, more neighborhood characteristics to the assignment plan, and the
permissibility of majority black schools." 492 F. Supp. at 184. On appeal, however, the black
plaintiffs altered their position and demanded county-wide busing.
112. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 189-92 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980).
113. Id. at 189.
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Judge Wiseman grounded his analysis in Supreme Court deci-
sions114 describing the ultimate goal of school desegregation litiga-
tion as the creation of a unitary system of public education. These
decisions required the school board to "'come forward with a plan
that promises realistically to Work, and promises realistically to
work now.' "15 Thus, Judge Wiseman believed it appropriate to as-
sess the effectiveness of a busing order and alter it to maximize
that effectiveness. 1 6
Judge Wiseman characterized the Davidson County school sys-
tem busing program as economically, educationally, and socially
undesirable. For him, "[t]he spectre that haunts all of the parties
to this case, the Court, and the community is a public school sys-
tem populated by the poor and black, and a private school system
serving the affluent and white. 11 7 Hence a rigid adherence to
black-white student ratios premised upon the social goal of assimi-
lation is not only constitutionally unrequired but also socially
undesirable.
Instead of recrafting a "traditional" busing remedy, therefore,
Judge Wiseman devised an original remedy. Increased emphasis
was placed on educational quality, with a particular focus on crite-
ria such as multicultural studies, smaller classes, greater accessibil-
ity of parents to teachers. 18 Unwilling to ignore integration, how-
ever, Judge Wiseman required that fifteen percent of either race be
represented in grade levels five to eight "because it seems to re-
present a reasonable attempt to provide intercultural and interra-
114. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
115. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 187 (quoting Green,
391 U.S. at 439).
116. That the 1971 plan did not encompass Davidson County's outlying suburban area
clouded the court's ability to assess its effectiveness. Thus, Judge Wiseman left his factual
analysis incomplete. He did not explain how analyzing the Nashville experience in imple-
menting a resegregative busing plan could aid in deciding whether a county-wide busing
plan would be more effective. Additionally, Judge Wiseman failed to answer the question
whether the school board's modifications signficantly changed the nature of the 1971 order.
If they did, the school board's "good faith" efforts might not provide any insights into the
efficacy of the 1971 plan. The Sixth Circuit did not rule on the significance of these analyti-
cal gaps in Judge Wiseman's fact-finding.
117. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 189 (M.D. Tenn.
1980).
118. For a description of Judge Wiseman's plan, see id. at 192-97.
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cial contact as a foundation for social harmony."' 9
C. The Sixth Circuit Reversal
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the educational components of the
Wiseman order.120 The court reversed, however, all portions of the
district court order addressing the racial imbalance in the Nash-
ville-Davidson County schools.' 21 The Sixth Circuit decided that
119. Id. at 193.
120. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1982).
The issue of when educational remedies are appropriate in a desegregation case remains
unsettled.
The Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Bradley II, held that educational remedies may be
appropriate in desegregation cases. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The Court required that desegrega-
tion remedies "be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.'" Id. at
280 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)). The Court, however, also
noted that "'[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving these problems.'" Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 281 (quoting Brown v. Board of
Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)) (emphasis added in Milliken II). In part, the total failure
of Detroit school authorities to effectively run their schools persuaded the Court to uphold
educational remedies. For instance, Justice Powell noted that the district court had "found
the structure of the Detroit school system 'chaotic and incapable of effective administra-
tion.' " Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 296 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Appellants Petition for
Certiorari at 124a); cf., Milliken If, 433 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[pro-
grams] of remediation [are often] necessary to supplement the primary remedy of pupil
reassignment").
Kelley presented a factual situation different from the Milliken cases. Kelley did not con-
cern educational disunity such as that which had plagued the Detroit school board. Instead,
the case considered the plan's inapplicability to certain public schools and the mass exodus
of white students. Judge Wiseman, therefore, did not need to issue specific educational di-
rectives. Instead, the school board could have decided what, if any, educational components
should be added to the desegregation plan.
Judge Wiseman's explicit educational directives represents a pragmatic equitable remedy.
In politics, pragmatic compromise solutions are justifed, even laudible. For a federal court
judge, however, they are not. The judiciary does not run our schools. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint ... [for] public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968). Interestingly, the Nashville-Davidson County School Board did not seek reversal
of this component of the Wiseman plan for several reasons. First, the Board was concerned
with establishing a good relationship with the judge overseeing its desegregation efforts. Sec-
ond, the Board thought Judge Wiseman's "educational plan" reasonable. Third, the Board
was concerned with having a positive civil rights image. Conversations with Marian Harri-
son, Nashville school board attorney (Sept. 15, 1982).
121. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 817-24 (6th Cir.
1982).
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Judge Wiseman improperly focused his attention on questions ir-
relevant to the case's one germane issue-racial imbalance in Da-
vidson County schools.1 22 Instead of inquiring into the plan's so-
cial, educational, and economic costs, the court believed Judge
Wiseman should have limited his focus to the sixty-eight percent
white to thirty-two percent black pupil ratio in the Davidson
County school system.123 Accordingly, the court viewed Judge
Wiseman's standard of fifteen percent of either race in grades five
to eight as clearly inappropriate. 24
The Sixth Circuit also viewed Judge Wiseman's reliance on
Nashville's experience in implementing the 1971 order as unneces-
sary. Such factors were insignificant in the resolution of the Nash-
ville case because the school board's actions led to increasing segre-
gation.125  The appellate court characterized the duty to
desegregate as a continuing one and defined desegregation as racial
imbalance, treating as irrelevant questions of educational effective-
ness and white students' exodus from public schools. 28
D. The Issue on Appeal
The Nashville-Davidson County school board, joined by the
United States Department of Justice as amicus curiae, asked the
Supreme Court to review the Sixth Circuit's decision. The school
122. See id.
123. See id. at 817.
124. Id. Under Judge Wiseman's plan, the district would have had a racial imbalance
19% greater than that in 1980-81 and 25% greater than that in 1971-72. The Wiseman plan,
however, would have reduced 47% of the racial imbalance existing throughout the system in
1970-71. The 1971 plan reduced 78% of the racial imbalance among these schools. M. Smy-
LIE, NARATrvE SuMMARY OF NASHVI -DAvmSON COUNTY SCHOOL DESEGREGATION DATA
(1982).
Under the Wiseman plan, 47 of 75 primary schools would have been more than 90% sin-
gle race with 14 schools more than 75% black. This disparity reflects a 48% increase in
racial imbalance from that in 1980-81 and a 59% increase from that in 1971-72. Id.
Under Judge Wiseman's plan, racial imbalance among secondary schools (middle and high
schools) would have declined 4% from 1980-81 levels but would have increased 5% over
1971-72 levels. The 1971 plan reduced 76% of racial imbalance among these schools. The
Wiseman plan would have reduced it by 69%. Id. These figures suggest that Judge Wiseman
may have gone too far, substituting social, economic, and educational concerns for racial-
balance concerns. The Sixth Circuit, which rejected Judge Wiseman's legal analysis, never
addressed this issue.
125. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 816 (6th Cir. 1982).
126. See id. at 818.
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board alleged that the Nashville case raised two significant legal
issues.127 First, the school board argued that Pasadena City Board
of Education v. Spangler prohibits the realteration of attendance
zones after a school board's good faith implementation of a busing
plan. 1 28 NAACP plaintiffs countered, asserting that the school
board's contention "can only be maintained by wholly ignoring
specific factual findings of the board's own wrongdoing. 1 29 Second,
the school board contended that Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education permitted a district court judge to alter a de-
segregation remedy in light of a school board's long-term good
faith efforts to implement a Swann remedy.13 0 Assuming racial bal-
127. The case also raised the issue whether "[t]he Court of Appeals decision ignored the
standard of review articulated by [the Supreme] Court for review of a desegregation de-
cree." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Kelley,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). Although important, this issue would have been decided in accordance
with existing Supreme Court standards. It would not have forced the Court to tackle a new
substantive legal issue-as would other issues raised in the Nashville case.
128. Petition, supra, note 127, at 9-10.
129. Brief in Opposition, supra note 110, at 21.
130. Petition, supra note 127, at 11-13. The Justice Department raised this issue in a
significantly altered form in their amicus petition: "This case presents questions of funda-
mental importance concerning the proper interpretation to be given Swann.... Swann
does not mandate the use of any particular remedial device (e.g., mandatory busing) but
instead indicates in general terms which devices are permissible and what the limits on their
use might be." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9,
Metropolitan County Board of Education v. Kelley, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). The Justice De-
partment, therefore, challenged the principle of busing, rather than the narrower issue
whether a district court judge could deviate from ineffective mandatory remedies.
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds has expressed concern that
mandatory pupil transportation remedies per se "are threatening to dilute the essential (na-
tional) consensus" "that racial discrimination is wrong and should not be tolerated in any
form." Speech before the Delaware Bar, supra note 1, at 9. The Reagan administration has
adopted this position because it believes that
the flight from urban public schools has eroded the tax base of many cities,
which has in turn contributed to the growing inability of many school systems
to provide high-quality education to their students-whether black or white.
Similarly, the loss of parental support and involvement has robbed many pub-
lic school systems of a critical component of successful educational programs.
When one adds to these realities the growing empirical evidence that racially
balanced public schools have failed to improve the educational achievement of
the students, the case for mandatory busing collapses.
Id. at 12.
The Reagan administration sought to use Kelley as a test of busing principles. Yet Kelley
raises a substantially different issue, namely whether ineffective busing remedies may later
be modified. In the Chicago desegregation case, however, the Reagan administration suc-
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ance measured effectiveness, NAACP plaintiffs maintained that
"the original constitutional violation was compounded by specific
acts of the board which resegregated the school system."'31 On
January 24, 1983, after several panel discussions and months of de-
lay, the Supreme Court denied the school board's petition.3 2
IV. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF DESEGREGATION ORDERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF Kelley'3
Supreme Court precedents suggest that three situations may
lead to the dismantling of a comprehensive busing plan. One, obvi-
ously, would be the attainment of a desegregated school system. 34
The Court suggested as much in Pasadena City Board of Educa-
cessfully argued that the busing remedy need not be utilized in all desegregation cases. In
Chicago, United States District Judge Milton T. Shadur approved an initial desegregation
plan, developed by the Chicago Board of Education and endorsed by the Reagan Justice
Department, that relies almost exclusively on voluntary measures. Judge Shadur agreed
with the Chicago school board's contention that "desegregation techniques which are-not
compulsory on children are the most effective and most practicable in achieving stable de-
segregation." Glenn, Cautious 'Pragmatism' in Chicago Plan, EDuc. WEEK, March 9, 1983,
at 24. See also Devins and Stedman, supra note 3.
131. Brief in Opposition, supra note 110, at 23.
132. See 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
133. This article does not answer the question whether the good faith efforts of the Nash-
ville-Davidson County school board in implementing the 1971 plan should terminate any
future affirmative desegregation obligations. The resolution of that issue requires analysis of
two questions not yet addressed by the Supreme Court (1) must a school district obtain
unitary status, whatever that means, before its duty to desegregate ends; and (2) can a good
faith, rather than a literal, implementation of a desegregation order end future liability
under Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler. See supra text accompanying notes
42-50. Although these questions are important, this article only analyzes the legal signifi-
cance to future obligations of a school district's success or failure in implementing a desegre-
gation plan.
134. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler suggests that a school district's lit-
eral implementation of a desegregation order satisfies the unitary status requirement.
Pasadena recognized that a court should not alter a desegregation order solely because de-
mographic changes beyond the control of the school board prevented full attainment of the
order's goals. See supra text accompanying notes 42-50. Additionally, the 1979 decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Spangler v. Pasadena City
Board of Education recognized that a desegregation plan may be in place for some time
before a federal court concludes that the effects of pre-plan constitutional violations have
been fully vitiated. 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, attaining unitary status, either as
racial balance or achievement of the desegregation plan's "racial balance potential," appears
to justify ending the school board's obligations.
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tion v. Spangler.15 Aside from the Pasadena area, only a few
school districts have achieved "unitary" status." 6 Because the 1971
desegregation plan impeded desegregation by excluding outlying
white suburbs and placing the burden of busing on black children,
the first situation did not exist in Kelley. Indeed, the "good faith
efforts of the School Board in implementing the Court's order"
amounted to unconstitutional segregation.137
Second, the continued disruption of a school district's educa-
tional processes, associated with interracial violence or decreasing
test scores, may also permit the dismantling of a Swann remedy.
In Swann, the Court cautioned that a desegregation remedy may
be limited if it otherwise would risk either "the health of the chil-
dren or significantly impinge on the educational process."
1 38
Neither Kelley nor any other suit, however, has involved such
issues.39
Third, a comprehensive -desegregation plan could be terminated
if it did not satisfy the Green mandate "that a school board devise
135. 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976).
136. See e.g., Ross v. Independent School Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983) (Houston);
Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975) (Atlanta); Beckett v. School Bd., No. 2214
(E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1975) (Norfolk). Based on its "unitary status," the Norfolk, Virginia,
school system recently elected to reduce significantly its massive cross town busing and re-
turn to neighborhood schools. The school board made the decision in response to both black
and white interest groups. The NAACP sued the Norfolk school board because a return to
neighborhood schools will lead to greater racial imbalance in that school system.
On July 9, 1984 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia up-
held the School Board's plan. Riddick v. School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, No. 83-326-N
(E.D. Va. July 9, 1984). The court held that because of the earlier finding of unitariness "the
burden of proof [has shifted] from the defendant School Board to the plaintiffs [NAACP],
who must now show that the 1983 Proposed Plan results from an intent on the part of the
School Board to discriminate on the basis of race." Id. at 10 (slip op.). In other words, the
Norfolk case, according to the district court, should be decided in a manner analogous to
Austin Indep. School Dist.. See supra notes 61-69.
137. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 479 F. Supp. 120, 123 (M.D. Tenn.
1979).
138. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971). -
139. In Tasby v. Wright, United States District Judge Barefoot Sanders used time-dis-
tance studies in determining that a county-wide pupil transportation remedy would unduly
risk the health of children in the metropolitan Dallas area. See 520 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Tex.
1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this portion of
Judge Sanders ruling. Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1983). In its ruling, the appel-
late court noted that "all of the parties who [in the past] have been urging increased deseg-
regation ... appear to be satisfied with the district court's decision." Id. at 92.
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a plan 'that promises realistically to work, and promises realisti-
cally to work now.' ",140 Because of Green, Judge Wiseman thought
it appropriate to assess and alter the preexisting busing order in
light of its effectiveness. His decision emphasized the dicta in Su-
preme Court desegregation decisions which stressed a balancing of
cost and benefit.141 For instance, these Court decisions suggested
that district courts must be guided by the sense of basic fairness
inherent in equity,142 and that they must also "tak[e] into account
the practicalities of the situation." 43
The Sixth Circuit, however, insisted that a school district subject
to a desegregation order could not deviate from present black-
white student population ratios when modifying the order. The
Sixth Circuit's holding directly contradicts the Pasadena decision
that a school district's literal compliance with a desegregation or-
der protected it from any further affirmative remedial obligations.
In Pasadena, the Court explicitly rejected the existence of a "sub-
stantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial bal-
ance or mixing.
'144
The rigidity of the Sixth Circuit's decision also conflicts with
Swann, which viewed student population ratios only as an appro-
priate "starting point" in designing a desegregation remedy.14 5 Ap-
parently, the Sixth Circuit construed the Supreme Court's require-
ment that a school district "eliminate all vestiges of past
discrimination" as requiring the district's schools always to reflect
its black-white student population ratio. This analysis conflicts
with the Swann ruling, unless one assumes that the Nashville com-
munity, absent intentional government segregation, would be natu-
rally integrated.
146
The Sixth Circuit decision ignored Nashville's unique situation.
As the school board pointed out, Kelley was "not a case involving
the imposition of a desegregation plan upon a system that is segre-
140. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
141. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
142. See Id. at 31.
143. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
144. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434 (quoting Swann v. Board of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24) (interpolation in original).
145. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 25; see also supra text accompanying notes 51-96.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 51-96.
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gated and is trying to achieve desegregation ab initio.1 4 7 Initially,
a presumption might very well exist in favor of pupil transporta-
tion plans which use black-white student population ratios. Nash-
ville had advanced beyond that point, however. Its ten-year experi-
ence offered lessons that could predict the effectiveness of future
desegregation plans. That experience ought not be ignored. Other-
wise, pupil transportation remedies become the end of desegrega-
tion litigation rather than the means of eliminating dual school
systems which deprive black pupils of equal educational opportu-
nity. As school districts increasingly fail to implement Swann
mandatory busing remedies, the issue rises in national
importance.
1 48
Perhaps Judge Wiseman incorrectly determined that expansive
busing orders would not eliminate racial isolation in Davidson
County schools. An admittedly faulty desegregation plan might in-
deed prove inadequate experience upon which to base such a deci-
sion. The Sixth Circuit, however, should have focused its attention
on Judge Wiseman's factual determinations, not his methodology.
The appellate court's failure may leave the Davidson County
school system in hopeless disarray.
V. DESEGREGATION LITIGATION: WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW?
Desegregation remedies attempt to restore the parties to a status
assumed to exist before official acts of segregation had their effect.
If intentional governmental segregation exists, courts must deter-
mine what remedy would restore plaintiffs to the status they would
have obtained had there been no such de jure segregation. The pa-
rameters of desegregation remedies would be defined by the nature
of the world absent intentional governmental segregation.
Social science evidence does not explain satisfactorily the impact
of governmentally fostered segregation. According to University of
Texas law professor Marc Yudof, "social scientists . . . teach the
need for humility and the foolishness of relying on pseudo-scien-
147. Brief, supra note 102, at 19.
148. In Boston, for example, public schools are more segregated today than they were ten
years ago. See Higgins, Boston's Busing Disaster, THE NEw REPUBLIc, Feb. 28, 1983, at 16.
For a contrary view, see Daniels, In Defense of Busing, The N.Y. Times Mag., Apr. 17, 1983,
p. 34.
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tific learning." 14 9 The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings con-
cerning the Neighborhood School Transportation Act illustrated
Yudof's point when both proponents and opponents of forced bus-
ing produced social scientist experts supporting their position.150
James Blumstein explained the failure of social .science research:
It is possible that, in a given set of circumstances, a plaintiff
could show a statistically significant causal linkage between past
segregative acts and current observed segregation; it is also pos-
sible that a defendant school board could present statistically
probative evidence rebutting that causal inference. Much more
likely, however, is that the results of statistical analysis will be
inconclusive. By the nature of statistical methodologies, no hy-
pothesis can either be proven or disproven in terms of fact. Sta-
tistical analysis identifies empirical relationships among observ-
able data that lend support to or cast doubt on hypotheses in
terms of probabilistic inference. 151
Supreme Court desegregation decisions evidence a vigorous de-
bate among the Justices about the nature of the world absent in-
149. Yudof, supra note 51, at 430.
150. The Neighborhood School Transportation Act would have prevented a court from
compelling busing of more than five miles or fifteen minutes each way. S. 528, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). Opponents of the Act predictably argued that busing best achieved racial
balance. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Willis Hawley identified five
"myths" of school desegregation: (1) desegregation has not substantially reduced racial iso-
lation; (2) desegregation can be achieved through voluntary choice rather than busing; (3)
desegregation undermines schools' ability to provide a quality education; (4) desegregation
leads to interracial conflict in schools, disrupting the educational process and increasing ra-
cial prejudice; and (5) school desegregation results in community conflict that undermines
race relations and disrupts the social peace. Testimony of social scientists James McPor-
tland (Center for Social Organizations of Schools), Reynolds Farley (Population Studies
Center), and Meyer Weinberg (Horace Mann Bond Center for Equal Education) further
supported Hawley's contentions. Hawley, The New Mythology of School Desegregation,
LAw & CONTMsP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 214. Opponents of forced busing claim that bus-
ing remedies fail to achieve anti-discrimination objectives, and lead to the five "myths" dis-
cussed by Hawley. Social scientists Herbert Walberg of the University of Illinois and John
Roos of Boston University testified at the Neighborhood School Transportation Act hear-
ings about the failure of busing.
The divergence of opinion among social scientists over the effectiveness of busing is evi-
dent in the literature. See 84 ScH. RIv. 309-447 (May 1976). Compare G. ORsFnM, MusT
WE Bus? (1978) with Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,
and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, LAw AND CoNmTP. PROBS., Autumn
1978, at 57.
151. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 12.
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tentional governmental segregation. Some cases, such as Green,
Swann, Keyes, Dayton II, Columbus, and Estes, suggest that ours
is a naturally integrated world. Other decisions, such as Pasadena,
Austin, and Dayton I, suggest that our world might be naturally
segregated. Although the conflict among social scientists and
within the Court has created a standoff, lower courts need some
standard as a principled basis for applying and enforcing desegre-
gation law.
The first step in framing a standard involves determining
whether mandatory desegregation remedies, such as forced busing
and restructured attendance zones, advance the interests of black
plaintiffs. Most likely, blacks have an interest in seeing an end to
racial isolation in public education. "[B]lacks are thought to bene-
fit educationally in a desegregated environment. . . .Society gains
by reducing racial and ethnic isolation and increasing inter-racial
networks of communication, friendships, and business relation-
ships. ' 15 2 George Peabody College of Education Dean Willis Hawl-
ey noted, based on social science data, that desegregation (1) en-
hances the academic development of minorities; (2) reduces
interracial conflict and prejudice; (3) benefits the development of
self-esteem, aspiration to achieve, and racial and ethnic identities
among minorities; (4) enhances the post-high school opportunities
and socioeconomic standing of minorities; and (5) increases racial
heterogeneity of communities. 153 Although some social scientists
disagree with Dean Hawley's conclusions,'" his conclusions pro-
vide support for black plaintiffs' demands for mandatory desegre-
gation remedies.
Having established that black plaintiffs have an interest in
mandatory remedies, the question remains whether courts have au-
thority to issue such relief.1 55 As James Blumstein has noted,
152. Id. at 9.
153. Hawley, supra note 150.
154. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
155. Owen Fiss and other advocates of mandatory desegregation remedies suggest that
proof by black plaintiffs that they have an interest in mandatory desegregation remedies
alone justifies such relief. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: the Constitutonal
Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564 (1965). To Fiss, a situation of de facto segregation would
justify such broad relief:
The abstract question is not: Is the creation and maintenance of racially im-
balanced schools and the assignment of children to them unconstitutional?
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Faced with a finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination, a
court must determine the proper remedy. It is axiomatic that a
remedy must correct a substantive violation of the Constitution,
restoring a prevailing party to the condition that would be ob-
tained in the absence of an unconstitutional act. The problem is
to determine what the world would have looked like if the Me-
gal, discriminatory activity had not occurred.5 6
Social science cannot provide a conclusive answer to the ques-
tion. 57 Consequently, courts must consider normative values.
Mark Yudof has suggested that courts must choose between the
racial neutrality principle and the universalistic ethic in framing
desegregation remedies.' 58 In accord with the pro-integration
model, the universalistic ethic recognizes "that a stable, just soci-
ety, without violence, alienation, and social discord, must be an in-
tegrated society."' 59 For the universalist, "[s]egregation of the
races . . . will inevitably lead to conflict and the destruction of
democratic values and institutions. In short, the goal is a shared
culture in which all segments of the population participate."160 Al-
ternately, the racial neutrality principle accepts the possibility of a
naturally segregated world. The communitarian values behind the
racial neutrality ethic support the right of parents to direct the
upbringing and education of their children. According to Harvard
Rather, it is: When is such action unconstitutional? The answer proposed here
is: When the justification for adhering to geographic criteria does not outweigh
the imperfections in the educational opportunity of those assigned to the im-
balanced schools.
Id. at 609.
Professor Fiss's approach ignores the issue of an equity court's authority. First, a school
district innocent of any intentional segregation certainly should not be subject to Brown II
remedial duties. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this contention in the Austin case. See
supra text accompanying notes 61-69. Second, the Fiss approach, focusing solely on benefits
which accrue to minority students, fails to recognize that desegregation remedies are limited
by the nature of the constitutional violation. A school district need only rectify the effects of
past discrimination. Thus, if it demonstrates that a school system would be naturally segre-
gated, mandatory desegregation techniques are inappropriate-even if minority children
would gain from such a remedy. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
156. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 9. Professor Blumstein does not attempt to answer the
question of what the world would look like absent unconstitutional segregation.
157. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
158. See Yudof, supra note 51.
159. Id. at 457.
160. Id.
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sociology Professor Nathan Glazer, "[i]t is a perfectly sound Amer-
ican path ... to assume that groups are different and will have
their own interests and orientations, but ... [also to] insist that
no one be penalized because of group membership ... .
Both the racial neutrality principle and the universalistic ethic
are solutions that are too extreme in their approach to the problem
of racial imbalance, especially given the inconclusive nature of so-
cial science evidence. Universalists seek to restructure the entire
educational environment of public school children, rather than
simply to eradicate the effects of past governmental segregation.
Conversely, the racial neutrality principle improperly assumes the
possibility of a segregative consistency in human behavior.
Fortunately, courts need not choose one of these extremes. In-
stead, they can adopt the sensible standard of a rebuttable pre-
sumption. Presumptively, courts should favor busing as an initial
remedy.162 Yet a school district's experience in implementing a
Swann remedy still can be used to rebut that presumption.
Mandatory pupil ratio plans should be presumptively favored as
a remedy in desegregation lawsuits for a number of reasons. First,
desegregation remedies seek to redress the wrong of governmen-
tally imposed racial segregation.16 3 Ideally, desegregation remedies
should result in the racial mix that would be found in a school
system had there been no state-mandated segregation. Because
government is the wrongdoer, courts as a matter of equity should
favor the plaintiffs. Second, mandatory busing appears more likely
than voluntary remedies to attain the approximate black-white
student ratio of an ideal system.1 64 Even in Nashville, where social
161. Glazer, Is Busing Necessary?, CoMMENTARY, March 1972, at 52.
162. In certain instances, courts may permit a comprehensive voluntary plan as a first
remedy. Such a plan, however, must include educational components that increase the like-
lihood of voluntary transfers from neighborhood schools. See supra note 19. If such a volun-
tary plan can be devised, the school district can stay the presumption that busing is a
prefered first remedy in desegregation cases. Yet if, after a reasonable period of time (as
defined by the district court), the voluntary plan has not led to the desegregation of area
schools, a school system should revert to the "rebuttable presumption" model which favors
mandatory busing as an initial remedy. See Devins, The Middle Road in Desegregation
Litigation, 3 EDUC. WK. - (1984).
163. See Taylor, Brown in Perspective, in EFFEcrivE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: QUALITY,
EQUITY AND FEAsmiLrrY (W. Hawley ed. 1982).
164. See supra note 130.
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science research indicated that comprehensive district-wide busing
would lead to whites fleeing the school system, no one disputed
that mandatory busing would result in greater racial balance than
voluntary plans. 1 5 Third, a presumption in favor of busing can be
rebutted by demonstrating the failure of busing to desegregate a
school system. By way of contrast, no plaintiff could rebut the pre-
sumption of a naturally segregated world. The very imposition of
government segregation would make people less willing to inte-
grate,16 which could make disproving the presumption of a natu-
rally segregated world impossible.
School districts could rebut the presumption mandating busing
with evidence of their experience in implementing a comprehensive
pupil transportation order. Because desegregation remedies are eq-
uitable, they ought to be fair, workable, realistic"1 7-- taking "into
account the practicalities of the situation."' 68 A district court
should carefully consider all evidence indicating the effectiveness
of future desegregation plans, including a school district's experi-
ence in implementing a past order. To he reliable, however, the
school district's actions must have been in good faith and over an
extended period of time.
This proposed standard of review offers several advantages over
other standards either proposed by commentators or adopted by
courts. First, it strikes a balance between the universalistic ethic
and the racial neutrality principle. Second, instead of using incon-
clusive social science research of national desegregation, the court
can use research specifically addressing the school district in ques-
tion. Third, a school district that effectively rebuts the presump-
tion in favor of busing may also rebut minority plaintiffs' interest
in mandatory desegregation techniques. Fourth, and most impor-
tantly, the scope of the remedy will fit the nature of the offense.
That, in sum, is the aim of equitable remedies.
In any given case, the proposed model places great reliance on
165. See R. PRME, PATrERNS OF WHrrE FLIGHt. 1971-1979. Dr. Pride's study and testi-
mony provided much of the factual basis for Judge Wiseman's 1980 order.
'166. David Kirp, for example, contends: "Discrimination might lie at the source of this
'disease,' but since it had taken on a life of its own, ending the discrimination without doing
more would not produce a cure." D. KImp, JUST SCHOOLs 23 (1982).
167. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971).
168. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
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federal district judges to determine two issues: (1) whether the
school board has acted in good faith over a sufficiently long period
of time for the court to determine the efficacy of a forced busing
remedy; and (2) whether the forced busing remedy effectively ad-
dresses the problem of illegal racial discrimination in area public
schools. The district judge can best make these decisions. He has
responsibility for overseeing local school boards in their efforts to
eradicate past racial discrimination.69 Because of this supervision,
the district court judge intimately understands the community and
its school system.
The proposed standard of review would have produced a differ-
ent result in Kelley. Judge Wiseman had examined the long-term
good faith efforts of the school board in implementing the 1971
plan and concluded that a comprehensive district-wide busing plan
would be ineffective. Thus, under the proposed standard, the
Nashville-Davidson County school board would have been exoner-
ated of future affirmative desegregation obligations, provided that
Judge Wiseman's finding that future busing would be ineffective
was not "clearly erroneous.
''
17
Contemporary judicial desegregation policy, as reflected in the
Nashville case, has placed the courts in conflict with the other
branches of government and the American people. Although bound
by the Constitution, courts have extended desegregation law from
well-principled constitutional law to the worst sort of judicial over-
reaching. Perhaps this overreaching will provoke congressional
challenges to the survival of courts as institutions.1 7 1 Certainly, it
has resulted in limitations on the American public school system
169. In Brown v. Board of Education II, the Supreme Court explained the role of federal
district courts in school desegregation lawsuits:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of
varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibil-
ity for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith imple-
mentation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proxim-
ity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts
which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.
349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
170. Assuming Judge Wiseman correctly applied the law, his decision would be overruled
only if his fact finding was "clearly erroneous." Deficiencies in Judge Wiseman's fact find-
ings are discussed supra in note 116.
171. See supra notes 9-10.
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that are both constitutionally unnecessary and educationally
unsound.
